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LAND AND WATER
LAW REVIEW
VOLUME III

1968

NUMBER 1

With the advances being made in modern psychiatric treatment
resulting in an increasing awareness of the subleties of the human
mind, it has become fashionable to renounce the M'Naghten Rule as
archaic. Dr. Robitscher takes a refreshingly different approach by
defending the rule. We are reminded of the history underlying the
rule and asked to view the rule for what it is: a test of legal responsibility not "medical" insanity. With these factors in mind, the author
proceeds to justify the rule from both a legal and medical standpoint.

TESTS OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY:
NEW RULES AND OLD PROBLEMS
Jonas B. Robitscher*

W

E are aware as we have never been before that change
is not necessarily progress and that overturning the
old order 'does not always lead to a millennium. This may
be a good time to stand up for M'Naghten1 in the face of
all those who have chosen newer positions. We can start
with three propositions:

(1) The M'Naghten Rules accomplished what they
were intended to accomplish;
(2) During the course of time they went through
an evolutionary process which reflected changes in social
and psychiatric thought; and,
(3) They are capable of still further modifications
which could make them as satisfactory as any other rule
since adopted or suggested concerning the plea of criminal
insanity.
• Staff Member, the Institute of the Pennsylvania Hospital, Phila., Pa.;
Lecturer in Law and Psychiatry, University of Pennsylvania Medical
School and Villanova University School of Law; A.B., Brown University,
1942; J.D., the George Washington University, 1948; M.D., The George
Washington University, 1955.
1. M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 .(1843).
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These are three statements which many would challenge. For many years now, it has been popular to point up
the short-comings of the M'Naghten Rules and the intellectual
limitations of the men who devised them, to see them as
harsh and cruel rules which treat insane people as if they
were sane and prohibit psychiatrists from testifying as they
would like, and to indicate that any future progress in the
field of determination of criminal responsibility can only
come through the development of new rules and new formulas.
But if my three theses are correct-if the M'Naghten
Rules accomplished what was intended, if they were modifiable to meet changing thought, and if they were capable of
still further growth and development-then it follows that
much of the time and effort that has been spent in devising
new rules has been wasted.
In the process of defending the M'Naghten Rules, we
can only conclude that those who have been formulating new
rules have not been fully aware of the background of M'Naghten, have been ready to discard the old without having taken
the trouble to understand it, and-perhaps most serioushave been attempting to impose their own standards on the
law without public 'discussion, legislative consideration, and
other essentials of responsible government.
Psychiatrists generally have been anti-M'Naghten; lawyers have been more supporting. The encyclopedic American
Handbook of Psychiatry, in an article written by Winfred
Overholser in 1959, said, "When the Durham decision was
announced there were cries of pain from the defenders of the
status quo, but an interesting fact is that nearly all of the
articles which have appeared in both legal and psychiatric
journals have praised the Durham rule as sound psychiatrically and legally." 2 Since that was written we have seen dis8 and the multiplication of rules
satisfaction with Durham
but only a few voices raised to 'defend M'Naghten.
If we defend the Rules we will have to see them in
historical perspective. It is tedious to once again review
the history of M'Naghten, Queen Victoria, and the Law
2. OVERHOLSER, Major Principle of Forensic Psychiatry, AM. HANDBOOK OF
PSYCHIATRY 1893 (1959).
3. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.D.C. 1954).
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Lords, but we must if we wish to answer those who see the
Rules as stupid or psychiatrically unsound.
Perhaps while we review the history we can also be
thinking of fishnets. In our society we are familiar with the
processes of classifying and sorting, of culling. Whether we
are sorting oranges or deciding who should be drafted and
who deferred, we go through the same process of culling.
Our decisions are meant to be practical; we set the openings
on the orange sorting machine so that some oranges are boxed
and others drop into the bin for juicing not because we think
some oranges are commendable and other oranges are blameworthy but because we believe this is the way oranges can most
effectively be marketed. We decide who should be drafted,
who rejected, and who deferred for Army duty not on the
basis of a moral judgment of the draftee--someone mentally
deficient who is rejected is not necessarily "bad" and someone who meets Army requirements and is accepted is "good"
but good only in the context we have chosen, usefulness in
the Army. The public policy that decides who should be
rejected and who accepted is like the private policy which
determines the destination of the oranges. One of the main
tasks of social policy has traditionally been to cull-we set
policy on who should be encouraged to propagate, who should
be given higher education, who should be classified as voters,
who should be considered criminals; the list is endless. Sometimes moral judgments are included, but a main consideration
is always what we think will best serve the kind of society
we hope to achieve. The first primitive masters of the art
of culling were fishermen ancestors who learned that in the
process of weaving their fishnets they could determine which
kind of fish they would catch. If they wove a fine net they
would catch the big fish and the middle sized fish and the
small fish and the flotsam and the jetsam; if they wished to
concentrate on a special variety of fish they could weave a
net with larger openings that would allow some fish to escape.
The size of the net opening is the classifier: it decides that
of the whole class fish there are some that we will retain and
some that we will allow to pass through.
In criminal law we have long had the policy of allowing
some defendants to pass through our net. As long ago as
Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1968
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1326, in the time of Edward II, the rule had been set forth
that madness, which later the courts came to call "insanity",
would relieve an accused criminal of the responsibility for
his actions." The 'defense of insanity has been well recognized
since that time in spite of the long centuries which lacked
psychiatrists to assist in determination of who could plead
the defense. Although the defense was well recognized, until
the M'Naghten Rules there was little consistency in its application. Before then many whom we see as sick were seen as
evil, possessed by witches, and many whom we would see as the
most harmless of petty criminals were hanged or burned or
beheaded, but the insanity defense continued to be erratically
recognized although often the application of the defense was
severely limited. Most eighteenth century authorities held
the defense could only be used when the defendant had as
little ability to use reason as a wild beast in the field or a
suckling babe in his mother's arms. Law recognized that
a guilty intent, the mens real, was an essential ingredient of
the crime, but only those who were completely incompetent
or demented or wild were seen as lacking the ability to have a
guilty intent. The fishermen wove a fine net, and few fish
passed through.
In the early nineteenth century-when the winds of
change were blowing-opinion swung back and forth about
the degree of illness needed to permit the plea. In 1800 when
James Hadfield was tried for an attempt on the life of
George III, although he was clearly not within the bounds
of the wild beast-babe in arms test the court allowed the
insanity plea because of evidence of insane paranoid delusions.' Twelve years later Bellingham, who had assassinated
the Prime Minister, Spencer Perceval, based his defense on
paranoid ideation which made violent revenge seem justifiable. The court narrowed the test, saying to make this defense
Bellingham would have had to show he was incapable of
distinguishing right from wrong.' But the pendulum swung
again, and in 1840 Edward Oxford, who had attempted to
assassinate Prince Albert and Queen Victoria,' and again in
4. J. BIGGS, THE GUILTY MIND 83 (1955).
5. Hadfield's Case, 27 State Tr. 1261 (1800).
6. G. KEETON, GUILTY BUT INSANE (1961).
(1812).
7. Oxford's Case, 9 C. & P. 525 (1840).

1 J. COLLINSON, LUNATICS 656
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1843 Daniel M'Naghten, who made what he thought was an
attempt on the life of the Prime Minister, Sir Robert Peel,
and succeeded in killing Peel's secretary, were found not
guilty on evidence of their paranoid delusions.
Queen Victoria was not amused. She was not capable
of imagining that a man could go through all steps necessary
for a predetermined crime, show signs of recognition of his
own guilt-and then plead insanity as a defense. She relied
on the distinction that Hale had first made 150 years previously between perfect insanity, also called total insanity,
which allowed the plea, and partial insanity, which did not.
(Lord Hale had the modern sounding view that most criminals suffered from mental illness: ". . . doubtless, most persons that are felons.., are under a degree of partial insanity,
when they commit these offenses." Perfect insanity excuses,
partial insanity 'does not, but "it is very difficult to define
the invisible line that divides perfect and partial insanity;
but it must rest upon circumstances duly to be weighed and
considered both by judges and jury, lest on the one side there
be a kind of inhumanity towards the defects of human nature;
-or, on the other side, too great an indulgence given to great
crimes.'"s)
So the Queen, Oxford's intended victim, in a letter to
her Prime Minister Peel, M'Naghten's intended victim, complained that the judges who tried these two men did "allow
and advise the Jury to pronounce the verdict of Not Guilty
on account of Insanity-whilst everybody is morally convinced that both malefactors were perfectly conscious and
aware of what they did." She asked for legislation which
would take away from the Judges the discretion to interpret
the law in their charges to the Jury according to varying
precedents. "Could not the legislation lay down the rule
which... Chief Justice Mansfield did in the case of Bellingham; and why could not the Judges be bound to interpret the
law in this and no other sense in their charges to the Juries ?"9
The House of Lords considered the question, found it
too 'difficult, and asked the fifteen Law Lords-the Judges
8. M. HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN (posthumous work, in various eds. from
1678 to 1773).
9. A. BENSON, 1 LETTERS OF QUEEN VICTORIA 1837-1861, at 581 (1907). (Emphasis supplied).
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who were members of Lords-to submit an opinion. The Law
Lords then formulated the MNaghten Rules, requiring the
defendant in order to plead the insanity defense to prove
that at the time he committed the act he labored under such
a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know
the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or, if he 'did
know it, he did not know that what he was doing was wrong.
The M'Naghten Rules were intended as a stringent test.
A tighter mesh was woven, to let fewer defendants through,
so that someone like M 'Naghten-whose defense was not that
he was totally insane but that he was partially insane, suffering from a homicidal monomania in which, acting under
the influence of instinct, he was led on by delusions to commit
the crime-could no longer escape the mesh, even if the
escape was not to freedom but only from the noose; M'Naghten was promptly adjudged insane and spent the remainder
of his life in a mental hospital. The Victorians wanted defendants who arranged well planned crimes to have the
responsibility for their actions and to be the object of
punishment which might deter others in spite of some degree
or even a great degree of insanity; they did not doubt two
principles which we have come to doubt, the principle of
the responsibility of the individual for his actions and the
principle of the effectiveness of punishment, particularly
capital punishment, as a 'deterrent.
The concept that an insane individual could be responsible for criminal actions has been denounced as cruel and has
been applied cruelly (although those who have led in the
denunciation have often been those most anxious to argue
the other side of the argument, that insane people have areas
in which they function normally, when the civil rights of
committed patients or the ability of an insane testator to
write a valid will have been in question). The classic statement of this point of view was that of the Supreme Court
of New Hampshire in 1871 in promulgating its own rule:
No "ingenuous student of the law" could read the MNaghten
tests for the first time "without being shocked by its exquisite
inhumanity. It practically holds a man confessed to be insane
accountable for the exercise of the reason, judgment and
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol3/iss1/10
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controlling mental power that is required of a man in perfect
health. "1
In British criminal law there are some clear examples
of insane offenders who were convicted and executed. The
1863 case of R. vs. Burton" dealt with an eighteen year old
boy we would almost certainly classify as schizophrenic. He
committed a motiveless murder. He had felt an impulse to
kill, sharpened a knife, and murdered the first boy he
encountered. The defense argued that he was insane and part
of his insanity was a desire to die by the hands of justice.
This pre-Freudian invoking of masochism (the term had not
yet been coined) did not appeal to Justice Wightman. In
sentencing Burton to death, he told him, "It is stated that
you laboured under a morbid desire to die by the hands of
justice, and that for this purpose you committed the murder ....The consciousness on your part that you could effect
your purpose by designedly 'depriving another of life.., was,
in truth, a further and may I say a deeper aggravation of
the crime." Hearing his sentence, the prisoner replied,
"Thank you, my Lord.""
As recently as 1950, in R. vs Rivett, s four psychiatrists
testified that the defendant, who had murdered his fiancee
after intercourse and who showed no remorse, was schizophrenic; there was no rebuttal evidence from the Crown.
Rivett was found guilty and hanged.
R. vs Straffen,14 in 1952, concerned a defendant who had
been adjudged insane prior to the time he committed the act
for which he was being tried. Straffen was a congenital
defective who had previously murdered, was found insane
on arraignment and was sent to Boardmoor, escaped, and
killed again. He stood trial for the second killing and at
that time the defense of insanity was rejected although it
was not shown that his mental state was different than when
he was first sent to Broadmoor as insane. Straffen was
sentenced to death; the Home Secretary commuted his sentence and he was returned to Broadmoor.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

State v. Jones, 50 N.H. 369 (1871).
R. v. Burton, 3 F. & F. 772 (1863).
H. MAUDSLEY, RESPONSIBILITY IN MENTAL DISEASE 157 (1874).
R. v. Rivett, 34 Cr. App. R. 87 (1950).
R. v. Straffen, 2 All R.R. 657 (1952).
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In Australia and New Zealand the Rules have been
interpreted much more liberally than in England. They have
been interpreted to apply not only to knowledge of legal
wrong but more broadly also to knowledge of moral wrong;
a defendant may have known his offense was punishable by
law but because of his insanity he may have thought the crime
justified, which enables him to plead the insanity defense
in Australia and New Zealand but not in England.
Also in Australia and New Zealand there is a tradition
of allowing the issue of insanity to be presented to the jury;
in England judges are more ready to rule there is no question
of insanity, thus shutting the door on psychiatric testimony.
In the United States, there has never been uniformity
on whether the M'Naghten Rules were to be interpreted liberally or narrowly. Judges and jurisdictions favoring a
strict interpretation might hold insanity not to be an issue
in a specific case where a psychiatrist might feel insanity
was very much an issue; particularly when 'defendants were
poor, ignorant, unable to pursue legal remedies, unrepresented by counsel or represented by disinterested counsel, or
when they were the objects of judicial bias, as Negroes have
been, the question of insanity was often ruled immaterial
or never even considered. The testimony of psychiatrists
was often limited to the narrow issue of the defendant's capacity to determine legal right and wrong; the testimony of
the psychiatrist was restricted, given little weight, and sometimes was negated by a judge's instructions to the jury
characterizing it as "opinion evidence" and therefore "low
grade. '
The question of whether the M'Naghten Rulesand the plural should always be used to show that there are
two separate tests involved-should be considered disjunctively or conjunctively has been settled narrowly in such jurisdictions as Alaska, Wisconsin, and Texas, where courts have
ruled that a jury charge was proper in spite of the substitution
of the conjunction "and" for the disjunction "or" between the
two tests. 6 (The Rules as promulgated by the Law Lords used
"or" to give the defendant two chances to prove criminal
insanity, (1) not knowing the nature and quality of the act,
15. Commonwealth v. Woodhouse, 401 Pa. 242, 164 A.2d 98 (1960).
16. 21 AM. JuR. 2D CRIMINAL LAW § 34, at 119 (1965).
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or (2) not knowing he was doing what was wrong. Substituting "and" for "or" narrows the application of the Rules
drastically.) The Rules are also given a much narrower
interpretation in those United States jurisdictions, following
the English view, where "wrong" is held to be knowledge
of legal right and wrong, rather than the Australian view
that the test concerns capacity to appreciate moral as well
as legal right and wrong-a much broader concept; political
assassins, for example, usually can be presumed to know
they acted illegally, but it is not so easy to make the presumption that they knew they acted immorally.
Certain United States jurisdictions, then, narrowed the
Rules to the utmost by excluding insanity as an issue or by
severely restricting and downgrading psychiatric testimony
if it was considered an issue, by stating that the Rules were
a simple "right or wrong" test, and by considering legal
right only, not moral right.
Other judges and other jurisdictions have been willing
to interpret the Rules more broadly, to allow complete
psychiatric testimony, to take cognizance of new psychiatric
ideas, in particular the basic tenet of Freudian psychology,
the importance of unconscious motivation. 7 Liberal jurisdictions have been willing to allow an enlarged scope for the
psychiatrist in the criminal trial for at least forty years, ever
since Clarence Darrow was allowed wide latitude in producing
psychiatric testimony concerning Leopold and Loeb (not to
show that they were criminally insane, but to show that there
were ameliorating psychiatric factors that argued for a
sentence less severe than capital punishment).
So we can argue that the M'Naghten Rules are inhuman,
and we can argue just as well that they are flexible and
capable of evolution, just as other common law doctrines are
flexible and capable of evolution. Judge Bazelon, in an
Isaac Ray Lecture seven years after his Durham decision,
recognized the potential for evolutionary changes in common
17. "To resolve the vital issue of criminal responsibility, it is necessary that
the jury have the entire picture of the defendant. Insanity resulting in
The jury must be given an
criminal acts is not a sudden growth . ...
opportunity to evaluate the expert's conclusion by his testimony as to what
matters he took into consideration to reach it." State v. Griffen, 99 Ariz.
43, 406 P.2d 397 (1965).
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law doctrines: "There is something quite curious about the
manner in which both the M'Naghten and 'irresistible impulse' rules have been construed by the courts. Neither has
been used creatively in the manner we like to think represents the 'genius of the common law.'18 Although we can
question the statement that there has been no creative development of law under M'Naghten, the ideas that M'Naghten
was inflexible and that it was unduly cruel have been behind
the drive to drop these Rules and substitute more modern
tests. Yet there is little doubt that under the Rules judges
and juries have been able to come to equable decisions. As
long ago as 1874 Maudsley said, "Of few insane persons who
do violence can it be truly said that they have a full knowledge
of the nature and quality of their acts at the time they are
doing them."19 The Lord Chancellor, Viscount Haldane, said
in 1924, "I have never heard of these Rules embarassing any
Judge who really had a case before him in which justice
required an acquittal."" Wily and Stallworthy, New Zealand
judge and psychiatrist respectively who have written extensively on the Rules, although urging that the Rules be
amended because satisfactory results under them sometimes
'depend on stretching the interpretation of the Rules or on
connivance between Judge and Prosecution, nevertheless state
that conviction of those insane in the medical sense is rare
even in England where the Rules are narrowly construed,2"
although they do not concede as much for all United States
jurisdictions.
The Rules must have ameliorated in other ways besides
broad construction and creative evolution. The doctrine of
irresistible impulse gives an additional ground for allowing
the plea; although not recognized in England since M'Naghten, it has been added to the M'Naghten tests in 15 of our
states, in Federal jurisdictions, in our military courts, and
in a number of British Commonwealth jurisdictions.22 The
most important amelioration of the Rules has been the doc18. D. BAZELON, EQUAL JUSTICE FOR THE UNEQUAL (ISAAC RAY LECTURESHIP
AwARD SEmIs 5-6 1961).
19. See H. MAUDSLEY, supra note 12.
20. Speech in the House of Lords, May 15, 1924, at the second reading of the
Criminal Responsibility (Trials) Act.
21. H. WILY & K. STALLWORTHY, MENTAL ABNORMALITY AND THE LAW (1962).
22. J. ROBITSCHER, PURSUIT OF AGREEMENT: PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 59
(1966).
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trine of diminished responsibility, originating in Scotland
in the Case of Dingwall in 1867. This century-old principle
of the law of Scotland allows the court to instruct the jury
that within its discretion it can return a lesser degree than
murder, culpable homicide, which does not carry with it the
death penalty, if it believes the defendant's mental state
would be adequate justification for the lesser verdict. Cases
in which diminished responsibility has been allowed involve
murder, by epileptics, mental defectives, alcoholics, and by
persons suffering from conditions "bordering on insanity,"
but not by persons merely intoxicated." The 'doctrine of diminished responsibility was made the law of England by the
Homicide Act of 1957. The 1961 New Zealand Crimes Bill
proposed the recognition of the defense of diminished responsibility, but this was withdrawn when the New Zealand Parliament abolished the death penalty for murder. 4 England, too,
in 1965, approved an antihanging bill and this, together with
the adoption of diminished responsibility, has quieted many
of the objectors to M'Naghten. The main reason a defendant
pleads not guilty by reason of insanity is to save his life;
if his life is not at stake, the possibility of an indeterminate
mental hospitalization, which often turns out to be permanent,
does not seem preferable to a fixed prison sentence, often
with the chance of time off for good behavior.
If United States critics continue to find MNaghten old
fashioned, what rule would be more modern 7 Since New
Hampshire courts adopted the "product test" in 1871, it has
been cited as a more modern and a more humane rule. The
determination of mental illness is a matter for the jury, just
as the presence of any other illness; psychiatric testimony
can be complete; the judge cannot dismiss the issue of the
lack of criminal responsibility; and the scope of the tests
possibly is widened to include more defendants. All of these
results are secured by a formula which allows the plea of
not guilty by reason of insanity if the criminal action was
the "offspring or pro'duct of mental disease."
It is well known that the New Hampshire doctrine was
derived from the pioneer forensic psychiatrist Isaac Ray's
23. F. WHITLOCK, CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY AND MENTAL ILLNESS, 94 (1963).
24. See H. WILY & K. STALLWORTHY, supra note 21, at 413.
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Treatise on the Medical Jurisprudence of Insanity,2 5 (an
American work which was heavily relied on in M'Naghten's
successful defense) and we know that the Durham Rule in
turn was based on New Hampshire. It is equally widely accepted that Ray was as modern as the Law Lords were conservative, that Ray understood mental disease as the Law
Lords did not, that Ray anticipated modern psychiatric
thought in his book published in 1838, when he at the age of
31 was a general practitioner in a Maine fishing village with
a population of less than 3,000. I do not think it is discredit
to Ray, although perhaps it reflects on those who cite Ray
to support sweeping changes in our criminal law without having digested his position, to point out that he was less
modern, less scientific, less anticipatory of future developments in psychiatry-although certainly he was no less
humane-than criminal law revisionists would have it. Lawyers, and psychiatrists too, have not been unknown to adopt
any available printed authority that will support a proposed
end without any great understanding of the author's position,
and because Ray found the M'Naghten Rules cruel and wrote
that they were cruel (and the Rules were cruel as they were
applied in Ray's day), he is cited as scientific authority for
the proposition that the M'Naghten Rules were based on
medical misconceptions concerning the definition and nature
of insanity.
Ray was a firm believer in phrenology, the science which
correlated human qualities with bumps and prominences of
the cranium, and just before he wrote his Treatise he had
done extensive translation of two volumes of the six-volume
work on functions of the brain by the author of phrenological
theory, Francis Gall.2" Phrenology leaves little room for
the doctrine of individual responsibility: if a man's future
can be predicted on the basis of palpating his cranium he
clearly cannot be held to be responsible for his assets or
deficits. Of phrenology, Ray wrote in his Treatise that it
was "the only metaphysical system of modern times which
professes to be founded on the observation of nature and
which really does explain the phenomena of insanity with a
clearness and a verisimilitude that strongly corroborate its
25.

I. RAY, TREATISE ON THE MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE OF INSANITY 1838 (1962).

26. Id. at xi.
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proofs . . . . " He deplores the hostile reception of phrenological knowledge:". . . In theory all mankind are agreed in
encouraging and applauding the humblest attempt to enlarge
the sphere of our ideas, while in practice it often seems as
if they were no less agreed to crush them, by means of every
weapon that wit, argument, and calumny can furnish."2 7
More important, Ray believed that all mental illness was
accompanied by organic impairment, although he thought that
sometimes the organic changes could not be demonstrated at
autopsy because they were too recent in origin or too transient
in character. He classified all mental disease as either falling
in the categories of idiocy and imbecility, the result of want
of the ordinary development of the brain, or of mania and
dementia, the result of some lesion of the brain structure
subsequent to its development. Since he saw mental illness
as invariably the result of an organic condition, Ray was
not willing to 'differentiate mental disease from any other
disease as far as responsibility for the symptoms of the
disease are concerned. The deranged defendant is no more
responsible for his actions than a leper for his sores.
Ray was very convinced that the diseases he described
were just as much organic diseases as typhoid, cholera, or
smallpox. As proof of the organic basis of all mental illness
he gave a circular argument which went from cause to effect
and then from effect to cause, unaware that logicians have
a special name for this kind of arugment, "the fallacy of
confirming the antecedent." Said Ray, ". . . Derangement of
the structure or of the vital actions of the brain must be
followed by abnormal manifestations of the mind; and consequently, that the presence of the effect indicates the exist28
ence of the cause."
We should note that in this strict adherence to an organic
basis for all mental disease, Ray followed in the tradition
of the great European psychiatrists of his period such as
Pinel and Esquirol, whose works he drew on, and we should
also note that modern psychiatry has many proponents for the
theory of an organic cause, although a much more subtle
type of cause than Ray adfd his contemporaries were postulat27. See supra note 25.
28. Id.
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ing, for such diseases as schizophrenia and manic-depressive
psychosis which most psychiatrists classify as non-organic,
i.e. functional. Heath and his group at Tulane,"9 for example,
believe that taraxein, a serum protein they have discovered,
is the cause or a cause of schizophrenia; other investigators
claim that a brain deficiency of serotonin, a hormone, causes
schizophrenia; and other investigators implicate the catecholamines such as adrenaline and its derivatives. Some investigators, particularly those who favor a psychopharmacological
approach to treatment, believe that other categories of psychiatric disorder now classed as functional-personality disorders, psychoneuretic 'disorders, and transient situational
personality disorders--may also prove to have serum protein,
hormone, enzymatic or other organic factors as their basis.
But the organic basis for what are now classified as
functional psychiatric disorders has yet to be proven, and for
our present purposes it is enough to point out that Ray's
theories have little in common with Freud and his followers
in modern dynamic psychiatry. They did provide a basis
for his opposition to the Law Lords who had said that one
could be insane and still be morally responsible for one's
actions. This to Ray was like saying that a patient with
smallpox was responsible for his spots.
One of Ray's most quoted arguments against M'Naghten
involved the patients found in mental hospitals who were in
hospitals because they were insane but who clearly could
tell right from wrong and were often, in fact, scrupulously
concerned with concepts of good and evil. These patients,
said Ray, proved the inhumanity of M'Naghten, but he did
not point out that the Law Lords were not considering the
question of crimes committed by adjudged lunatics, they
were considering the case of defendants living in society and
not claiming to be ill or in need of special protection of the
law until after they had committed a crime, at which time
they first made a claim to insanity.
For 83 years from 1871 to 1954, the whole of the English
speaking world continued to use the M'Naghten Rules, sometimes with modifications and additions, except for New
29.

R. HEATH, SEROLOGICAL FRACTIONS IN SCHIZOPHRENIA, RESEARCH SYMPO-

SIUM (1968).
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Hampshire which relied on the "product test". In 1954,
with the Durham decision, the dike began to crumble, at first
almost imperceptibly, recently more rapidly. The Durham
decision, like other decisions promulgating new tests and
rules, is based on the mistaken assumption that the Law
Lords in M'Naghten defined insanity, and defined it rigidly
and narrowly on the basis of their ignorance of the nature of
insanity. So the Durham decision can state that the rightand-wrong test is "based on an entirely obsolete and misleading conception of the nature of insanity," and can quote
Sheldon Glueck, legal scholar, as authority for the statement
that it is unscientific to abstract "knowing", the cognitive
ability, out of the total personality in which will and feeling
are also elements. Simon Sobeloff, when Solicitor General
of the United States, wrote: "Medical psychology teaches that
the mind cannot be split into water-tight, unrelated, autonomously functioning compartments like knowing, willing, and
feeling. These functions are intimately related and interdependent. We know today that the external manifestations
of mental disease follow no neat pattern permitting pat legal
definitions suitable for universal application," and he quotes
Judge Doe, author of the New Hampshire rule, for the
proposition that "the mistake of our predecessors" was
adopting contemporaneous medical opinion as law."0
We can only repeat that the Law Lords never attempted
to define insanity, were not so stupid to think that their
Rules separated the insane from the sane; all they attempted
to do was to cull from the whole class of defendants pleading
insanity those whose insanity was sufficient to rebut the
presumption of guilty intent. It is easy to call the M'Naghten
Rules stupid if one misrepresents them as a definition of
insanity; it is harder to call them stupid if one states they
stand for the proposition that even the insane are sometimes
responsible for the consequences of their actions.
The Durham decision was hailed as progressive and enlightened by most psychiatrists and some lawyers, in spite
of the fact that there has always ben some question as to
whether the Durham decision was the adoption of the New
Hampshire rule in a Federal jurisdiction or was the formula30. Sobeloff, From M'Naghten to Durham and Beyond, 29 PSYCHIAT. QUART.857

(1955).
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tion of an entirely new test. Such noted commentators as
Sobeloff and Overholscr"1 believe Durham is substantially
the same as the New Hampshire rule; such noted commentators as Reid 2 and Davidson" point out that the attempt in
the New Hampshire rule was to do away with all tests on
the basis that medical conditions cannot be encompassed in
tests and to let the jury 'decide, but the DurhamRule, although
in much the same words as the New Hampshire rule, does
represent a medical test, a much broader medical test than
any heretofore proposed. Not its vagueness but its breadth
caused second thoughts about Durham; it soon became apparent that a test so broad is not a test at all and that to make
it workable psychiatrists would have to testify authoritatively
about matters which are still mysterious. Ray felt he could
testify without equivocation about whether or not a disease
was present; the jury could accept or reject his opinion; if
it found a disease present ithad to determine if the disease
accounted for the crime. When we broaden our definition
of disease to include all sorts of functional conditions which
are not capable of being demarcated and diagnosed with the
certainity of smallpox, which overlaps in their diagnostic classifications, which do not assuredly represent distinct entities,
the psychiatrist is not able to testify with the assurance of a
Ray-and who is left to guide the jury?
We have been told in Time 4 and other equally authoritative publications that the test for criminal responsibility
of the American Law Institute's Model Penal Codes' is a
great advance over Durham and M'Naghten and that the
decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit in the Freeman" case, which adopted the ALl
test for the Second Circuit, is lucid and replete with psychiatric, legal, and historical scholarship. Says Time, "What
Kaufman and his fellow judges liked about the new rule was
that it was not only a giant step forward from M'Naghten
31. Id. See Overholser, supra note 2.
32. Reid, The Working of the New Hampshire Doctrine of Criminal Insanity,
15, U. MIAMI L. REV. 14 (1960). See also, Reid, Understanding the New
Hampshire Doctrine of Criminal Insanity, 69 YALE L.J. 857 (1960).
83. Davidson, In defense of the M'Naghten Rule, 1 PENN. PSYCH. Q. 20 (Spr.
1961).
34. TIME, Mar. 11, 1966, at 32.
35. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
36. United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1966).
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but also a viable solution to the problems of Durham. Instead
of 'knowing' the difference between right and wrong, the
defendant is now subject to the subtler requirement of 'appreciating' it. Similarly, proving the act a 'product' of
the disease now becomes the more reasonable task of showing
that the disease resulted in a loss of 'substantial capacity'
to obey the law." 3 7 The story of the Emperor's New Clothes
comes to mind, but there are no small boys in the crowd to
exclaim that the 'difference between "knowing" and "appreciating" may be no difference at all, no small boys to call
Utopian the Freeman case's recommendation that those who
cannot control their behavior should be "treated at appropriate mental institutions for a sufficiently long period to
bring about a cure or sufficient improvement so that the
accused may return with relative safety to himself and the
community," no small boys to gasp when Judge Kaufman
states that if there are insufficient hospital facilities and
doctors to deal with criminals found to be incompetent under
his formula, then "Congress, the state legislatures and federal
and state executive 'departments should promptly consider
bridging the gap."
A more recent issue of Time tells of two New York
lawyers who failed to report respectively $34,000 and $119,000
of income to the federal government. The conviction of the
first of these was reversed; while the defendant was on bail
appealing his sentence the Freeman case abolished M'Naghten
and thus has made the insanity defense a possibility; in the
second case, tried under the ALI rule, the defendant got
a hung jury after his psychiatrist testified he was not psychotic but had morbid depressions that inhibited him from
finishing work. All of which proves that not all lawyers lack
respect for psychiatric testimony.
What can a psychiatrist say about the multiplication of
rules? In the first place, he can point out that under all
the tests we have described courts repeatedly ask psychiatrists to make unpsychiatric determinations. Psychiatrists
can describe, diagnose, and treat mental illness, but they
cannot crawl into a defendant's cranium, see the world
through his eyes, determine for the court such subjective
37.

TIME,

supra note 34.
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information as whether he knew or appreciated the difference
between right and wrong, whether the act was the product
of his disease, whether he had a substantial capacity to conform. All of these concepts have more legal reality than
psychiatric reality. A psychiatrist for example can give
details of previous mental troubles, trace the course of a
developing illness, demonstrate ego deficiencies-all of which
may indicate a defendant might have found an impulse more
irresistible than might a man with a stronger ego. But the
point at which an impulse crosses the borderline from resistibility to irresistibility is not a determination for a psychiatrist; it can only be made in the abstract by a meta-physician
and in the concrete by a judge and jury. Many years ago
Zilboorg pointed this out by saying, "To force a psychiatrist
to talk in terms of the ability to distinguish between right
and wrong and of legal responsibility is ... to force him to
violate the Hippocratic Oath, even to violate the oath he takes
as a witness to tell the truth and nothing but the truth.' '
The American Bar Foundation has said, "Since the psychiatrist cannot accurately determine the defendant's capacity
to 'distinguish right from wrong on the basis of his medical
expertise, his testimony on this issue is largely conjecture or
a reflection of his own personal judgments of whether or not
the defendant should be held responsible."" The same criticism should be made of a psychiatrist testifying that a crime
is the product of a disease or that the defendant lacked
substantial capacity to conform; the psychiatrist is a variety
of medical witness, not a mind reader, fortune teller, or
surrogate justice.
How can a psychiatrist help in the criminal trial process . He can help by presenting evidence which throws light
on the background and mental state of the defendant, assuming he has not secured his information by any improper
distortion of the doctor-patient relationship. (The psychiatrist interviewing a defendant must either act as a doctor in
the interests of the defendant or, if he is in the employ of
the courts or of the prosecution, inform the defendant that
he is not serving in the function of the defendant's doctor.)
38. N. BUrTMACHER & H. WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 406 (1952).
39. F. LINDmAN &. D. MCINTYRE, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW,
REPORT OF THE AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION 837 (1961).
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Confessions secured by psychiatrists are not unknown to
American courts." Whatever the test, modern judges cannot
attempt to understand defendants and deal with them ration-

ally without as much help as psychiatrists can provide.
A psychiatrist can help by refusing to take on his
shoulders legal determinations which are properly the func-

tion of judge or jury.
Perhaps he can help most by pointing out the neurotic

quality of the quest for the definitive rule, the perfect test,
the test which will do away with the painful soul-searchings
of judge and jury. He can help by pointing out that it is
the resultant of many factors-cultural, religious, ethical,
emotional, practical-which determine the disposition of a
defendant, not only the test employed. For documentation,

see the growing body of decisions which indicate that even
under a rule as liberal as Durham, decisions can be as harsh
as they were in the heyday of M'Naghten. (One such case
is State v. Park, 193 A.2d 1 (1963), in which a Maine court's

conviction of a 15 year old boy was upheld.)41
The psychiatrist can point out that the defendant who
pleads the insanity defense under any rule has committed
an act that has harmed society and he is usually not safe
enough or sane enough to be allowed freedom.2 Whether his
detention is in a hospital or a jail, he will need psychiatric
help-but he is not likely to get it. State hospitals, hospitals
40. See Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1953). In this case, a state employed
psychiatrist was introduced to the defendant as a doctor who would treat
his attack of sinus. "Time and time and time again the psychiatrist told petitioner how much he wanted to and could help him, how bad it would be
for petitioner if he did not confess and how much better he would feel,
and how much lighter and easier it would be on him if he would just
unbosom himself to the doctor." Id. at 559. A microphone had been hidden
in the room, the state prosecutor and police officers were listening in
another room, and the psychiatric interview was also taperecorded. For a
treatment of the ambiguous position of a doctor whose employment is for
purposes other than aiding the patient, see J. RORITSCHER, supra, note 22,
at 203.
41. See Reid, supra note 32, where it is pointed out that under the liberal
New Hampshire test, the State Hospital which must submit a report on
New Hampshire defendants has often used the "right-or-wrong" test, the
narrowest application of the M'Naghten Rules, as its standard to determine
if the crime was the produce of mental disease.
42. Some jurisdictions allow the jury to return an undifferentiated "not guilty"
verdict which allows the defendant to go free, rather than the special
verdict of "not guilty by reason of insanity" which requires or can require
mental hospitalization. The undifferentiated verdict would have little to
recommend it either from the point of view of the defendant who has claimed
insanity and should be willing to accept help or from the point of view of
society which has a right to be protected from irresponsible acts.
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for the criminal insane, and prisons suffer equally from
lack of man-power, lack of a climate in which psychotherapy
can be attempted and in which the doctor-patient relationship
is respected, and lack of public interest in providing better
facilities and more services.
Even with the proper climate, enough manpower, proper
facilities, the prognosis is poor; lawbreakers often lack to
a large degree the desire to seek changes in themselves and
the ability to trust a therapist, the chief factors of successful
treatment. Even if the treating psychiatrist were not on the
prison's payroll, responsible for parole recommendations, or
were not on the hospital's payroll, having summary power
over length of hospital stay, the prognosis would be guarded.
In spite of this, the psychiatrist can still be most useful as
a therapist after judicial determination, not as an expert
witness in the course of a trial.
If the death penalty is abolished, if prison senteces are
shortened to be consistent with deterrence and rehabilitation
rather than revenge, and if psychiatric and other rehabilitation services are provided, it will not make any real difference if a disturbed person who has admittedly done an
illegal act is treated in prison or in a mental hospital; in
either case he will have problems of guilt, in either case he
will feel he deserves punishment; in either case he will
respond-if he responds at all-only to thoroughgoing and
sincere efforts to help him whether the setting is called prison
or hospital. (What we call our institutions is less important
than what we do in them. It is time we recognized the inhumanity of indeterminate sentences, which represent a peculiar
20th century cruelty imposed on the pretext that we are therapists and not jailers, even when the prisoner-patient is not
amenable to treatment. Psychiatrists must begin to speak up
to protest the part they are expected to play in the disposition of those imprisoned or hospitalized under sexual psychopath laws, which allow men to languish in jail or mental
hospital for a lifetime, awaiting their "cure", when their
crime under less "modern" legislation might have merited
comparatively minor punishment. It is time that lawyers
speak up for these defendants whose rights to time-honored
criminal trial procedures are stripped from them because
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol3/iss1/10
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they are being removed from society for "therapy"
"not for reasons of punishment.") 4 "

173
and

Whatever our tests, we should recognize that the test is
less important than the spirit and wisdom with which it is
applied and the climate in which the determination is made,
that the test should be capable of evolution, and that the test
is of concern not only to lawyers, psychiatrists and malefactors, it is also a matter of public concern. The ultimate question is the extent to which the individual should be held
responsible for his own actions, and that is important enough
to be worthy of a great debate.
New problems on the horizon are ready to plague us in
much the same way as M'Naghten, Durham, and our other
points of dispute because they also reach the question of how
much man is in control of his own destiny. The Driver" case
and similar cases, 5 based on the very dubious finding that
chronic alcoholism is a disease, state that certain products
of chronic alcoholism cannot be considered a crime. In spite
of the fact that no less an authority than the American Medical Association by decree has made alcoholism a disease, no
real distinction exists between alcoholism and such other
compulsive addictions as barbiturate addiction, amphetamine
addiction, and narcotics addiction, which start out as functional illnesses and do not become organic diseases until
fairly late in their course, nor are there major differences
between the psychopathology of the alcoholic and such other
repetitive antisocial defendants as the compulsive gambler,
exhibitionist, homosexual. All these conditions and many
more--including acute alcoholism, kleptomania, embezzlement, and repetitive criminal activity-represent emotional
illness, but they are not diseases like cholera, multiple sclerosis, or diabetes.4 '
43.

See J. ROBITSCHER, supra note 22, at 153.

44. Driver v. Hinnant, 356 F.2d 761, (4th Cir. 1966).
45. Easter v. District of Columbia, 361 F.2d 50, 53 (D.D.C. 1966) which holds
that "one who is a chronic alcoholic cannot have the mens rea necessary
to be held responsible criminally for being drunk in public."
46. For a recent discussion of basic differences in the treatment of medical
disease and emotional conditions susceptible to psychiatric intervention, see
Pleune, All Dis-ease is Not Disease: a Consideration of Psychoanalysis,
Psychotherapy and Psycho-social Engineering, 46 INT. J. PSYCHO-ANAL.

358 (1965). Former Representative (later Senator) Kenneth Keating has
inquired in Congress about the problems of dealing with a defendant whose
only identifiable mental disease or defect is "a morbid propensity for
crime." Rovere, THE NEW YORKER, Apr. 19, 1958, at 81.
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The authors of the Driver and related decisions have
opened a Pandora's box that makes any discussion of criminal
responsibility centering around M'Naghten or Durham seem
like a kindergarten exercise. The Driver case states that the
alcoholic's drunkenness in public is not his act, for he did
not will it, and that such conditions as alcohol addiction constitute a "status" and that such behavior as public intoxication an "involuntary symptom of a status." The decision
does not annul the North Carolina statute against public
drunkenness; it only states that a chronic alcoholic cannot
be criminally guilty under the statute. Questions we may
ask: is the distinction in the case between the chronic alcoholic
and the merely excessive "steady or spree drinker" valid?
Who determines and what criteria are used to determine
whether an alcoholic falls within the category of addicted
alcoholic or is merely an unaddicted alcoholic? Concerning
cure, can the addicted alcoholic be cured within a reasonable
period of time or will he have to spend the rest of his life
in a treatment center? And is this preferable to ten days
or even ten months for public drunkenness? Again, if public
drunkenness is excusable in an alcoholic, is stealing to finance
the drinking expedition also excusable? What about murder
committed by an alcoholic? Is the inabiilty to will rigidly
confined to the act of drinking itself or does it extend into
other areas? Finally, who will treat and cure the alcoholics?
Most reputable psychiatrists would not be too helpful about
the results of involuntary treatment. Where will the personnel be found to man treatment centers for hundreds of
thousands of such patients, for if the District of Columbia,
with a population of 750,000, has already 3,400 "card-carrying" alcoholics, certified as chronic alcoholics and given cards
exempting them from arrest for drunkenness, we can extrapolate that the total in the whole country who might be
awarded such cards is more than 900,000.
Are we prepared to undertake the cure of all these
unfortunates? Not only the alcoholic but the addict and the
arsonist and the exhibitionist is suffering from a 'disease, as
is the delinquent, the child beater, and many more. If following Driver we drop all these crimes from our statute
books, we will need mental hospitals with guards instead
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol3/iss1/10
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of attendants and with wardens instead of physicians-in-chief
to take care of the diseased in our midst.
Perhaps someday we will be ready to say that all criminal
activity is the result of disease, as Durham and Driver
encourage us to say; if so we should be prepared to take care
of the deluge of sick people we will be called upon to treat
and we should be drawing up blueprints for a new type of
society in which individual responsibility has little or no
place.
Logic and fairness tell us that not all defendants have
equal abilities to control their own actions and to avoid
anti-social activity. If you are born into certain conditions,
suffer certain early cruelties and deprivations, are molded
into certain patterns, experience certain tensions, then there
is little chance that you will emerge as conflict-free, reasonable, amenable to the restrictions of the law. You will
have more hatred, you will be more prone to violence, you
will have less self control, you will not have the ties of
loyalty and love that keep us from committing more and
worse antisocial actions than we do. Sociologists have described slum families where the difficulty is not understanding
why all children except one become criminals; the difficulty
is understanding why one child escapes from the social pattern. Someday we may wish to discard the idea of individual
responsibility, we may feel our futures are ordained by our
environments and our chemistry, we may wish to scrap
M'Naghten, to interpret Durham broadly, to apply Driver to
every crime in the book. We should consider some of the
recent work of psychologists such as Krech47 who has found,
working with rats, that permitting the young animal to grow
up in a psychologically impoverished environment creates
an animal with a relatively deteriorated brain--"a brain with
a relatively thin and light cortex, lowered blood supply,
diminished enzymatic activities, smaller neuronal cell bodies,
and fewer glia cells. A lack of adequate psychological fare
for the young animal results in palpable, measurable deteriorative changes in the brain's chemistry and anatomy. The
47. Krech, In Search of the Engram, MED. OP.& REv. 20 (Aug. 1966).
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rat's brain does not live by chow alone." 48 Harlow

has

demonstrated that rhesus monkeys isolated from their mothers
at birth and brought up without contact with animals or
humans continued to show, long after the end of the isolation,
hostility, uncoordinated sexual behavior, reduced playful interaction, a high level of fear, and maladaptive aggression
against both adults and infants. Dr. Grace Gregg recently
told the American Academy of Pediatrics that only a small
percentage of "battered children "-children assaulted and
beaten by their own parents-show promise of becoming
self-sufficient adults."
Someday we may well conclude that absence of the
proper psychological climate during formative years may be
the most important factor in predisposing humans to crime,
and we will concern ourselves with massive programs of
rehabilitation and prevention rather than deterrence and
punishment. If and when we come to this conclusion we
should have more knowledge than we do now about the
therapy and rehabilitation of those whom we absolve of
responsibility, we should have some concept of how to protect
society from the effects of hostility and aggression, we should
have some substitute for the power of punishment as a deterrent, we should know more than we do now about the effect
on our entire social structure of the concept of individual
responsibility.
Certainly it is within our power to dispense with the
idea of responsibility; we can make a clean break with the
tradition of the Law Lords; we can forego classifying and
culling and wipe all crimes from the statute books. If we
decide to abandon the concept of responsibility, let us do
it knowingly, with thought and study and deliberation and
public debate, not by the piece-meal undercutting of basic
assumptions of a civilized society by ill-planned reforms
which rely on a misreading of history as their rationalization
and which depend on formulas, instead of plans of action,
to solve social problems.
48. Id.
49. Harlow, The Effects of Early Experience Upon The Personal-Social,Heterosexual, and Maternal Behavior of Rhesus Monkeys, Trans Amer. Neurol.
Ass'n 87 (1962). Harlow & Harlow, Social Deprivation in Monkeys, Sc.
AMER. 207 (Nov. 1962).
50. Beck, "Battered" Children, Philadelphia Inquirer, Dec. 13, 1966, at 30.
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